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Pursuant to an agreement reached betwen the Office of Public 
Safety (OPS), the East Asia Bureau (EB/SEA) and the USAID Mission 
in Korea, Mr. Thomas Finn and Mr. James Cretecos of the OFF& 
staff visited Korea from 6/28/n to 7/18/7l, for the purpose of 
conducting an evaluation of the Public Safety project with the 
Korean National Police (KNF'). 
The evaluation was not prompted by any significant changes in 
the internal security situation or substantive changes in the IMP'S 
organization, role or mission. All of these factors vere sube+sntially 
the same as identified in earlier studies 
I / z / w  
conducted in the 
country. However, with the Public Safety project scheduled for 
termination on June 30, 19n, it was deemed advisable to conduct 
an evaluation in order to determine the effectiveness of past and 
present assistance efforts. 
The terms of reference contained in STATE 036603 guiding the 
Teamn s activities & in part as follows: 
Evaluate the effectiveness of past and present AID 
Public Safety project beginning 1966 as related to 
counter-infiltration threat; and its appropriateness 
Survey of the Korean National Police and Coastal Security, 
(S) Goin, Harrington, 1965. 
z/ A Survey of Civil Internal Security Forces, Republic of Xorea 
(S) Goin, Shannon and Thurston, 1966. 
2/ Republic of Korea National Police Telecommmication Survey 
(MU) Katz and Naurocki, 1968. 
4/ Assessment of the Public Safety Program, USbTD/Koma, Goin 
and Leister, 1969. 
as an instrument in strengthening the intarnal mcurity 
and stability of Korea within t h  context of U.S. interest, 
objectives and economic program in Korea. 
M u a t e  the effectiveness of project implementation, 
manuring degree to which project goals have been 
achieved. This w i l l  include evaluation of use of 
various project components, including technical advi- 
sory services, c d i t y  support and participant train- 
ing. Lessons learned here may be useful in AID Public 
Safety projects to other countries. 
In view of the fact that the totality of project resources 
was focused on the improvement of ICHP counter-infiltration capbilities, 
the scope of the Team's study and, therefore, of this report is ilmited. 
The report does not discuss the police organization in its entirety 
but only those elements directly concerned with counter-infiltration. 
Consequently, for a broader and deeper understanding of the Korean 
National Police organization, readers are directed to previous studies 
indicated by footnote on the previous page. 
At the tine of the Team's arrival, the project was in its final 
stage of termination. Of the four Public Safety advisors on board 
when the Team arrived, one (Mesloh) left the following day (June 29, 
19n), one (~oodvin) left the next day (June 30, 1 W ) ,  and the Chief 
Public Safety Advisor (Bush) was scheduled to depart post about 
July 15, l w ,  but was extended to assist the Team in its project 
evaluation. The Communications Mvisor (Gormont) had been extended 
until December 1 9 n  in order to assist in the installation 3f son, 
pipeline communication commodities scheduled to arrive after the 
project termination date, June 30, 197l. 
During the Team's stay in Korea, field trips were made to 
various police elements at Chon Ju in Cholla Pukto Province and 
Pman in Kyongsang Namdo Province, in addition t o  the Police College 
a t  hpyong in Kyonggi Do. The purpose of these visits vas t o  con- 
duct on-site observations of police act iv i t ies  and operations 
which corresponded to  project objectives and activities.  For example, 
Cholla Pukto Province has major Combat Police Company activity; and 
in Pusan, which for  two years was the location of the regional office 
fo r  the Area Public Safety Generalist advisors (Hatem and Goodwin). 
Meetings vere held with many U.S. and Korean officials.  'Ihe 
%am members are most appreciative of the time, effort,  hospitalities 
and courtesies extended to them during their  stay in Korea. (See 
k x  A, p.61 for  list of officials.) 
A t  the conclusion of the Team's visit, oral briefings regarding 
findings, conclusions, observations and recommendations were given 
to the Ambassador, Mission Director, ard Program Officer. 
In reviewing the observations section of this report, it may 
appear that  the Team went beyond its objectives in addressing 
issues not specifically cited in the terms of reference. To do 
otherwise, however, vould be to ignore significant aspects of the 
role of the police in a developing society and more specifically, 
the ro le  of the IWP in the rapidly expanding economy that  Korea 
is presently experiencing and w i l l  be facing in the buebiate Future. 
SUMMARY OF - OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
following represents a summary of the Team's observa- 
tions and recommendations: 
Observations and Conclusions 
Program objectives have generally been met,  and with few 
exceptions the project a t  termination has been successPul. kan- 
ingful contributions have been made to  increase the efficiency and 
capability of the Korean National Police in counter-infiltration 
operations. 
Notable among program accomplishments has been the creation 
of tact ical  and administrative radio systems fort if ied with a train- 
ing and maintenance capability; increased mobility through the pro- 
vision of 886 vehicles which represent a p p r d t e l y  35% of the 
t o t a l  f l ee t  of 2,500 vehicles; a new armory w i t h  an anummition re- 
loading unit and weapons repair and maintenance capability together 
with three mobile weapons repair teams that are operational and pro- 
viding required services t o  f i e ld  units; a force of &lW? trained 
and equipped Combat Police deployed in Coast Watch stations and 
effectively carrying out thei r  counter-infiltration responsibilities; 
a 9,000 man reserve Task Force specially trained in unit tac t ics  
constitute a quick-reaction back-up force for deployment as  required; 
a specially trained and equipped Seoul ktropol i tan &bile Task Force 
of approrimately 500 men in an ever-ready state of preparedness who 
can be conmitted imed ia t e ly  within the Seoul metropolitan area 
in emergency situations.  
Shortfal ls  i n  projact objectives were noted a s  follows: 
1 )  Training Lqti tut iona;  have not been suf f ic ien t ly  
upgraded a. d have not attained the qual i ta t ive 
or qumt i t - . t ive  levels  called for ;  
2) No comprehmsive plan f o r  protection of key 
s t ra teg ic  ' .nstallations and f a c i l i t i e s  has been 
developed; 
3) The > k i n e  Dolidel a key element of KNP1s counter- 
infi1tratic:l e f for t ,  Waa given only token support 
(participar+ training and 2 &@plus barges) aad 
the project  goal of improving the patrol,  search 
and l i a i son  capabi l i t ies  of t h i s  v i t a l  un i t  w a s  
l a rge ly  ignc -ed. Even the limited connnodity sup- 
port  plannec f o r  in the 1970 Pro& (radar and 
searchlights) was cancelled by the USAID; 
4 )  The public ~e la t ion /c iv ic  action objectives received 
only minimal assistance. 
Limited observations of the functional efficiency of the KNP 
reveal some serious deficiencies and indicate much needs t o  be done 
t o  improve the eff ic iency of the organization. Force l eve l  projec- 
t ions  for  the next f ive  years, f o r  example, call f o r  an increase of 
36,800 men. This r a i s e s  a question re la t ive  t o  economy of force 
concepts of the KNP and the e f fec t ive  use of manpower resources. 
This, coupled with budget l imitations,  rapid urbanization of the 
population and increased securi ty  respons ib i l i t ies  vlll place a 
staggering burden on the KNP. In l i g h t  of U.S. interests, Fa'& 
securi ty  and economic, technical advisory assistance should be 
continued, directed mainly toward strengthening tbe KNP i n  ins t i tu-  
t iona l  areas t o  ensure i t s  viabi l i ty .  
-@ 
(1) An in-depth survey be conducted of the KNF' t o  identify its 
strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities t o  sustain itself as a 
viable inst i tut ion in relation t o  its security and l av  and order 
responsibilities. Such a study should assess the relati- hpor- 
tance of the KNP in the social and economic sectors as well as in 
the area of internal security, and relate t h i s  t o  the develop 
mental act iv i t ies  of the ROKG. 
(2,) The Team strongly reccrmmsnds continuation of U.S. participant 
training despite the absence of a Public Safety project in Korea. 
Ideally, KNP representat ins should attend each of s e n n  courses 
conducted in Ebglish a t  the IPA mual ly .  Functional specialisa- 
t ion fo r  KNP officers attending the ZPA should concentrate on 
Organization and Administration, Resedch and Planning, 
Instructor Msthods, Patrol Functions, Police-Public Relations 
and Marine Police activities. 
NATURE OF THE THREAT 
Agent Infiltration: 
In January 1965, Premier K i m  I1 Song of North Korea out- 
lined a three-point program for reunifying and cammunising Korea: 
1 )  To overthrw the Park Government. 
2) To convert the Republic of Korea into a neutral nation. 
3) To Corce the withdrawal of U.S. Forcas from Korea. 
Again, in Octobsr 1966, he stressed four taeks t o  be done 
in ccmmuuiaing Korea: 
1 )  To build Korea into a revolutionary base. 
2) To strengthen revolutionary forces in South Korea. 
3) To eliminate U.S. imperialiste in Korea and in Asia. 
4 )  To eliminate U.S. "stoogesn fran Korea and from Asia. 
With th i s  in mind, the Ccmmuuists launched anti-ROK operations; 
i.e., the dispatch of subversive agents, the organisation and strength- 
ening of underground cells,  and the diesamination of inflammatory 
propaganda. (3n January 22, 1968, 31 armed North Korean inf i l t ra tors  
attacked South Korean policaolsn and civilians in Seoul in an at- 
t o  raid the Residential Mension and k i l l  President Park. 
Tvo days la te r  the North Koresns i l legally seised the U.S.S. 
Pueblo d e n  it vas in international uatars off the coast of North 
Korea. In November of 1968, in the largest military operation in 
Korea since the end of the Korean conflict, 120 North Korean 
commandos landed on the northeast coast of the Republic of Korea. 
These North Korean actions were probably adoptad with a d e w  
t o  the eventual accomplishment of the regime's long-term objec- 
tive, i.e., the unification of Korea under C o d s t  rule. In 
the short term, the actions may have been motivated by the desire 
to  t i e  down ROB forces, in f i l t ra te  Communis t  agents into the ROK, 
and disrupt the economic and poli t ical  progress which has taken 
place in the ROK in recent years. 
North Korean aggressions continued a t  reduced rates in 1969, 
1970, and In the f i r s t  half of 197l (see figure 1, p 2 ) .  'he 
reduction may have been due to measures taken by the ROK dth U.S. 
assistance to improve i t s  defense capabilities. It is also pos- 
sible that the reduction vas the result of North Korea's strategy 
t o  deny President Park a rallying point in his campaign for  the 
Presidency. In any event, even though infi l t rat ion attempts have 
decreased, they continue to exist  and may uel l  increase in the im- 
mediate future. The possibility of Lnfiltration by means of airdrops 
is also very real now that  reported a i rcraf t  acquisitions (helicopters 
and l ight  planes) by the North Korean %connaissance Bureauh has been 
oonfirrmd. 
Interrogation of captured agents and defectors tends to support 
the intelligence reports that  North Koreans, trained in  special 
schools, capable of conducting mbversion, espionage, agitation and 
military guerrilla action, intend t o  engage in these operations in  
South Korea unt i l  the objectives recited above are accomplished. 
(Refer t o  Assessment of the Public M e t y  Program, U S B I D ~ O ~ ~ ~ ,  
November 1969, Coin and Leister (pages 6,7 and 8) for =port on North 
Korean infi l t rat ion capabilities. The information available t o  the 
team indicated that  the North Korean capabilities as  refered to in 
the Goin Report are s t i l l  valid.) 
Figure 1) summary of lncid8nts 1966-1971 
Jncidents 
DMZ Real 
37 13 
452 277 
542 219 
98 36 
71 35 
22 6 
- 
U.S. 
= Demilitarized Zone 
N.K. = North Koreans 
K = Killed 
W = Wounded 
C = Captured 
* 
Figures complete through 30 July 19n 
SOURCE: 8th Army G-2 
ROK Military 
Crime : 
-
While the record vill show an overall decrease i n  the incidence 
of crimes reported t o  the police, th i s  does not indicate a lessening 
of a serious problem for the police. Curfew violations and registra- 
tion act  infractions are reported as %rimesn and both of these 
offenses have shown a marked decrease over the l a s t  fev years. Con- 
versely, the Republic of Komhas experienced a growing incmase in 
felonious crimes during the sanm time period. Murder, rape, arson, 
thefts,  fraud and robbery are reported on the increase - particularly 
in the urban areas. Other offenass such as smuggling, embes%elenent 
and bribery are reported on the increase in the more rural areas of 
the Republic. 
U. S. POLICY IN KOREA 
Ihe Department of State "Background Notesn dated October 
1970 states in part: 
The United States seeks under the principles of self- 
determination, a free, independent, and democratic Korea, 
peacefully unified through elections under U.N. super- 
vision, with a National Assembly in uhich representation 
is proportionate t o  the indigenous population. Pending 
achievement of th i s  objective, which has been obstructed 
by the Communists who reject the competence of the United 
Nations t o  deal with the problem, the United States seeks 
t o  strengthen and support the Republic of Korea so that  
it may achieve reasonable security against any renewal of 
Communist aggression and may attain economic viability. 
The strategy section of the Public Safety Non-Capital Project 
Papar , dated 12/1/69 states : 
In recognizing the c r i t i ca l  nature of the threat posed 
by the North Korean infi l t rat ion,  the U.S. strategy 
is t o  help strengthen the overall capacity and effective- 
ness of the ROKG in internal security activities. % i s  
project complements the U.S. Military Assistance Program 
in Korea, which directly aids the Korean military by pro- 
viding needed assistance t o  the KNP, the civilian enforce- 
ment agency of the govermment. The U.S. plan is t o  con- 
centrate on the counter-infiltration aspects of the public 
safety situation, largely leaving the other areas of 
police work needing assistance t o  Koma's own resources. 
By helping Kolea t o  counter the North Korean infi l t rat ion 
efforts, the U.S. is also enhancing its other devulopant 
programs. The noteworthy economic progress that  h a  
already taken place in Korea can continue only if there 
is relative s tabi l i ty  and safeguards against war and other 
disturbances. The U.S. has already made a heavy invast- 
ment in Korea's security and economic growth, and this 
project can, in part, be v i e ~ d  as a measure of insurance 
in protecting that  investment. A t  the same time by h e l p  
ing the ROK t o  develop an Mependent civil ian police 
force, the U.S. i s  striving t o  counter-balance the exist- 
ing predominance of the military in Korean l i fe .  Finally 
the U.S. assistance i s  planned t o  bolster ROKG efforts in 
earning the confidence of the Korean people in the nation's 
police force. 
Since the Korean W a r ,  the United States has maintained 
substantial forces in the RDK. In accmdance with the N h u n  
Doctrine, which envisages that other countries u i l l  assume a 
larger share of their defense burdens as the growth of econories 
parmit them t o  do so, authorized U.S. strength in Korea vas 
reduced from 63,000 t o  43,000 troops during f iscal  year 197l. 
This reduction, hotaver, does not affect the basic camitaent 
of the U S .  t o  the defense o fa the  ROK as se t  forth in the Mutual 
Defense Reaty of 19%. Coincident with this troop reduction, 
the U.S. Government is assisting tho ROKG in a modernisation 
plan for  its armed forces. lhis plan is s p e d  over a fiva pear 
period with U.S. financial assistance amounting t o  approxim.¶tely 
$ l . 5  billion. (The Country Team Concept for  ROB bbrnal Security 
sod Counter-Miltration Cperations included aa Annex A in t he  
Coin and Leister report cited earlier shovs how the U.S. p p o e e d  
t o  implament i t s  policy in Korea). 
THE KOREAN NATIONAL POLICE 
The Korean National Police is  a centralized c iv i l  police force 
employing approximately 45,000 officers and men and functions as a 
part of t h  Ministry of Home AffaFrs. The authority of the police 
is derived frm that inherent in the powr of the state in Um 
enforcement of edicts, but i s  not defined specifically by the 
Corstitution, by law, or  by decree. 
The present organization of tbe National Police was established 
by the Organization Rule fo r  the Minister of Hame Affairs in Cabinet 
Decree No. U6, October 2, 1961, amended t o  Presidential Decree Ilo. 
1824 on May 27, 1964. (Figure 2 on page reqlscta the present 
organizational structure of the KNF'.)* The functional responsibil- 
i t i e s  of the police are: 
Enforcement of law and ordinances; 
Maintenance of public order; 
Protection of l i f e  and property; 
Prevention of smuggling ( p r b q v  responsibility of the 
Minister of Finance, Gustcma Bureau); 
Prewntion of enemy agent inf i l t ra t ion a d  in-aomtry 
act iv i t ies  (shared vith the Korean Counter-Intelligence 
Corps, as wll  a6 the Korean bra(y and Havg, and the Unitad 
States Central Intelligence Agency); 
* 
Ihe Team notes that the chart ahow the Police College, llaritim Police, 
Police Hospital and Scientific Crime Laboratory elements reporting 
direct ly to the Vice Minister. lhis rafees questions as to the 
validi ty of this chart i n  depicting KNF' reparting charmels. Yhile 
the Maritime Police Commsndant vas ecrmewhat unsure of his r e p o w  
channel, the Comander of the Police College repeatedly stated that 
he reported directly t o  the Director General of police. Time 
limitations precluded a resolution of this question by the Team. 

Protection of the fisheries f l ee t  (shared with the 
Mjnistry of Agriculture); 3EaEL 
Protection of forests  (prima; responsibiyty of the 
Ministry of Agriculture). 
A Vice-Minister, within the Hame Affairs Mbistrg, has the 
p-rg responsibility for the adndnistration of fmda allocated to 
the police force. Reporting t o  the Vice Mbister  i s  tbe National 
PoUce Cannnander, who is also the Director of the Police But-eau. 
tvelve main divisions: achninistration, plarnring, public safety, 
guard, f i r e  protection, investigation, intelligence, colmmmications, 
foreign affairs,  equipoent, t raff ic,  and Homeland Defense Divisions. 
The Director is also responsible fo r  eleven police bureaus - 
nine provincial bureaus and the metropolitan police bureaus of Seoul 
and Pusan. In aidition, the Police College, axxi Scienttific Investi- 
gation Laboratory, the Police Hospital, and the Marinf? Police (coast 
guard) are also within the jurisdiction of the Dire*. 
The p u c e  are distributed throughout each area in units and 
stations varying in size according t o  local  requbemuts. In 1968 
there were 165 police stations, 1,39& substations, and about 1,000 
smaller units, including detachmnts. In addition, tbe Natianal Police 
has 37 ccaubat police companies that  are trained in special U b r g  
tac t ics  for counter3nsurgency activi t ies,  and all poli- 
have had some training in guerilla warfare. 
Note: The foregoing was obtained from the "Area Bandbook f o r  
the RepuaYc of Korea - prepared fo r  the Bmerican University 
by Westwood Research, Incorporated - 1969'' and a s  d s e d  
t o  ref lect  the  current situation. 
Readers will note this excerpt indicates the  Police Cdllega, 
ScientFPic Investigation Labaratorg, Pdlice Hospital and Marine 
Police are "within the urisdiction of the Directorn while the 
KNP organhation chart i Figure 2) reflects  these elenu=nts report- 
ing directly t o  the Vice Minister. 
Details of the KNP organization are contained in the " m y  
of the C i v i l  Internal Security Forces, Republic of Korean (Goin, 
Shannon and Thurston, 1966) and update? the Goin, Leistar "Public 
Safety Program Besessment Reportn dated November 1969. 
While there have been no ~ubstantive changes in the organiza- 
t ion of the force since 1969, there has been an increase of 1,736 
men in the force strength. In conversations with the Mrector- 
General of the National Police, he indicated the KNF'vaa planning 
for  7,000 additional men in  19'7l-19R t o  permit a c~~lltrp-wlde 
expansion of the police box network. (Further planned increases 
in the force strength are shown in Figure 3, p. 17 . Also, see 
Figure 4 , p. 18 for  Manpomr Distribution Chart.) 
The general provisions of the ProAgs gmrn ing  the Public 
Safety project wre quite broad. Aa an example, the following 
specific description is excerpted from the 1970 Pro&: 
This is a continuing project under which the USAID has 
been assisting the Korean Natianal Police in its efforta 
t o  develop en effective c iv i l  police organization capable 
of enforcing the law with a minimum uae of force, PO- 
taction of l i f e  and property and maintenance of internal 
stability. This e f for t  is coincident vith the priori ty 
given by the ROKG t o  the developnent of the IIationel 
Police as the primary instrument for  the maintentmce 
of public order. 
Howver, the language of the P r o m  goes on to confine the 
Public Safety program t o  the following specific KliP Functional 
en t i t i es  that deal direct ly with the KNF' role in couuter-infiltration 
operations : 
National poUce 6 Year Recruitment Plan: 
i 9 n  7,0@3 
1972 5,700 
1973 5,700 
197b 5,300 
1975 6,lr00 
1976 6,700 
Total 36,800 
Figure 3) KNP Force Strenlth Increases - Projected 
17 
ENP IuNPmm DISTRIBrnION 
(as of July 12, 1971) 
Police Agencies 
HQs 
Maritime Police 
Police College 
Seolll 
Pusan 
wonggi Do 
Kangwa Do 
Chungchong Buk Do 
ClnmgchongNamDo 
CholLa Buk Do 
ChoUa Nam Do 
K p n g s a n g  Nam Do 
Kpangsang; Buk Do 
Cheju Do 
Total 
Grand Total 
Police &n 
981 
948 
154 
8,774 
3,665 
3,822 
2,533 
1,703 
2,957 
3,305 
5,267 
4, a 3  
4,905 
675 
43,932 
Fire Hen 
11 
figure 4) KNP Manpower Distribution Chart 
1. Combat Police 
The inital "Sweep Teamn concept designed t o  develop forces 
that  would engage in Rural Patrol in areas suspected as inf i l t ra t ion 
(* 
routes was revised in 1967 and the Combat  Police Force csme into 
being. Where the sweep teams were designed as a patrolling force 
who muld provide a police presence and service to the people in t lm 
remote areas t o  which they were assigned, the Combat  Police units are 
primarily designed as s ta t i c  elements whom patrol function is 
confined t o  l a te ra l  routes between their  fixed posts. They are 
paramilitary-trained personnel vfio are deployed along the saa coast 
in relatively uninhabited areas where enemy agents are l ikely to 
attempt penetrations, consequently, they do not provide conventional 
police service to  the people as the original aveep teams wre designed 
t o  do. 
Originally, 37 Combat Police companies consisting of 4,107 officers 
and men were authorized. Under a Legislative Act paseed in 1970, the 
present lll-man companies will be increased to  175 for a t o t a l  strength 
of 6,475. However, it is estimated that  the training and implementation 
of these additional increments w i l l  take from tw to four years. 
With the exception of five companies that  are assigned t o  special 
areas of responsibility (mountain watch stations in the interior, the 
* Precedence for these paramilitary Combat Police elements was 
established just a f te r  the Korean War vfien some 40,000 Canbat 
Police were created w i t h i n  the KNP to r id  the Republic of 
mountain-antrenched C w s t  elements. Their mission accom- 
plished, these forces were mbsequently eliminated from the 
police structure. 
Combat Police are assigned t o  the three most southern provinces 
and Che ju Do Island. (See Figure 5, p. 21 f o r  the Table of 
Organization and muipment of the Combat Police Company. ) 
2. Emergency Task Force 
The Emsrgency Task Force i s  a 9,000 man force specially 
trained t o  provide a police capabili ty t o  counter sizeable North 
Korean in f i l t r a t ions .  It i s  made up of regular police personnel 
that perform the i r  normal police functions u n t i l  an emergency 
s i tua t ion  develops a t  which time, they serve a s  a back-up fo r  the 
Combat Police, or c i t y  o r  provincial police elements. 
The number of companies, platoons, o r  squads i s  not constant, 
being determined by the number of police s ta t ions  and police boxes 
together with personnel strengths in the provinces and c i t i e s .  The 
platoon is the pr incipal  combat un i t  in the task force, and in most 
instances wi l l  operate independently of other task force elements. 
The basic purpose of the task force organization i s  t o  provide 
within the regularly assigned national police, a capabili ty t o  cope 
with enemy agent i n f i l t r a t ion .  
The total manpower of the emergency task force is 9,184 men 
which when coupled with the h,lW in-place C o m b a t  Police, creates  
a force of 13,291 special ly  trained men. (See Figure 6, p.22 fo r  
the orgaaisational composition and location of the b r g e n c y  Force.) 
3. Seoul Metropolitan Mobile Force 
The Seoul Metropolitan Police maintains a ready reserve force 
t h a t  was or ig ina l ly  planned a s  a 407 man uni t ;  hotever, the strength 
f luc tua tes  t o  meet emergency situations.  A t  this time, there are 
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figure 6) Emergency Task Force - Force Deployment 
581 assigned t o  this unit. Reportedly, the present owrstrength 
can be attributed t o  anticipated student demonstrations, the 
Presidential inauguration and continuing threat of enemy agents. 
This force has received special training and equipment t o  meet 
emergency situations. Of this uni t ,  180 are on standby duty 2.4 hours 
a day. They are housed near the National Police Headquarters and 
can be quickly transported t o  any trouble area within Seoul City 
as required. (See Figure 7, p.24 for  the table of Organization 
and Equipwnt of the Seoul Mobile Force. ) 
4. Homeland Defense Reserve Force 
The Homeland Defense Reserve Force (HDRF) vas created shortly 
af ter  the assault on the Blue House in 1968. It dram its strength, 
numbering some 2,4@2,338, from all walks of the Korean population a 
great many of &om are former members of the Armed Forces. Its 
primary mission i s  t o  stand ready for instant mobilization in the 
event of an emergency requiring large numbers of trained and equipped 
personnel t o  thwart an invasion or large scale inf i l t ra t ion attempt. 
Personnel of the H E W  also help man the Coast Watch stations 
during the nighttine and assist the police in patrolling the urban 
centers during the 12 A.M. t o  4 A.M. curfew that, with the exception 
of Cheju Do Island, is in effect throughout Korea. The personuel 
of the HDRF are not compensated Por their  sel-vlces and each person 
provides h i s  om uniform and food ration while on patrol. Houever, 
they are only required t o  serve on the average of one day each 
month and their  day's absence from regular occupations is  not deducted 
from their  salaries in either the government or  private sectors. 
T/o&E OF SEOUL MOBILE FORCE 
Authorized Personnel 
Present Strength 
Busses 
Dodge a ton truck 
Dodge 1* ton trucks 
f ton jeep 
Bneored Vehicles 
Total Vehicles 
Carbine refles 
Shotguns 
Total 
Gas Launchers 
Gas masks 
Figure 7) Seoul Mobile Force - Table of of Org. and Equip. 
Their weapons are stored in armories that e r e  constructed 
especially for this  purpose in various parts of the Republic - 
most commonly a t  the regional police headquarters areas. Additional 
arms storage f ac i l i t i e s  were constructed contiguous t o  various 
selected police box stations (a fac i l i ty  having a complement of 
from 6 t o  10 police personnel). 
The ROK army has the training responsibility (as noted earl ier ,  
a great many of the HDFiF have had previous military training). 
Formerly, the KNP provided instructor personnel to  ass is t  in this 
training effor t  but were relieved of th is  responsibility in June 19n. 
In the three southern provinces, the HLRF comes under the cogni- 
zance of the KNP. The military exercises control over these forces 
in a l l  other areas of the Republic. Hovever, i n  a mobilization situa- 
tion, all HDRF and police personnel come under the jurisdiction of the 
Senior Military Commander in their  respective areas. (See Figure 8, 
p. 26 for  HLRF Strength and Weaponry. ) 
5. Maritime Police Force 
ds an element of the Korean National Police, the Maritime Police 
Force is charged with the responsibility for  maintenance of peace and 
order in the te r r i to r ia l  vatars of the Republic. In this regard, it 
is  responsible for the preservation of l ives and property, prevention 
of c r h ,  the apprehension of criminals and their  prosecution in catr ts  
of law. 
Specifically, the force has responsibility for  countering the i l legal  
movemnt of people into the country by sea, for  the suppression of ill- 
egal movement of goods into and out of the Republic, for  maintaining 
order i n  the fisheries areas, and for search and rescue and salvage 
operations a t  sea. 
-mF- 
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283.086 
772 .XI, 
16.576 
18.220 
1,090,186 
Uith a to ta l  complement of 
varying sizes and tonnage, the 
948 officers and men and 51 boats of 
Maritime Police performa a vital role 
in the counter-infiltration efforts  of the Korean National Police. 
Their primary responsibility in this  area is to  interdict enemy 
agent craf t  attempting t o  in f i l t ra te  South Korea by sea. The ROK 
navy assists  in this  effor t  by patrolling the waters =award off the 
east  and west coasts of the peninsula southward from a la tera l  exten- 
sion of the D W  t o  the northern boundaries of Cholla N d o  and 
Kyongsang N d o  provinces in the south. Seaward patrols south from 
these points are tb sole responsibility of the Maritime Police. 
Additionally, they have patrol responsibility for  all coastal areas 
of the peninsula, assisted t o  a degree by limited provincial police 
boat patrols. 
An effective coastal barrier could be created by M i n e  Police 
and ROK navy radar-equipped vessels which would form a "picket linen 
patrol and act  as an nearly warningn system for coastal defenses. 
Hovever, the existing limited resources of the Maritime Police pre- 
cludes the formation and implementation of th i s  mideal" system. 
The counter-infiltration responsibilities of the M t i m  Police 
include the monitoring of Korean fishing f l ee t  vessels which have 
been marshalled into squadrons with radio-equipped boats to identify 
suspected in f i l t ra to r  craft.  They also have the responsibiLity, in 
cooperation with Japanese Maritime &forcement elements, of maintain- 
ing order among the ~orean/~apaneee fishing boats in international 
waters. (See Figure 9, p. 28 for Elanpowr DeplopBnt of the mi- 
Police. ) 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
MBRIFlZ POLICE 
1. Wpouer Distribution 
Headquarters & Pusan Base 
(combined) 
Personnel 
244 
Inchon Base 19 
Mokpo Base 
Yoau Base 
Pohang Base 
Mulch0 Base 18 
sokcho Base 19 
Ghe ju Base 
Aboard Ship 
TOTAL 
Rank 2. -
Director 
Senior Superintendent 
Superintendent 
Captain 
Lieutenant 
Sergeant 
Senior Patrolman 
Patrolmsn 
TOTAL 
Figure 9) Marine Police - Strength and Deployment 
THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM 
U.S. assistance to the Korean National Police, (I(RP), begun 
i n i t i d l y  in 1956, has had a mercurial history. Folloviag the 
initial program inputs from that date to 1962, the act iv i ty  waa, 
unt i l  1966, confined to a one man advisory e f for t  concerned lpostly 
with providhg the KNP with excess property and increasing its 
vehicle maintenance capability. 
Up t o  the beginning of calendar year 1967, the nature and 
extent of the threat from North Korea, although recognized as 
being on the increase, ras slowly matched by concrete stepa on the 
part of the Republic of Korea Gavemuimnt (ROKG) to increase the 
KNP capability to counter the threat. HOWV~F, during f i s ca l  year 
1966, the KNP w i t h  USAID support, developed and implemented a *Sueep 
'Iream" concept to meet the problem of enemy agent infi l t rat ions.  
The basic strategy of this concept was to create units of 9 man 
specially-trained, mll4quipped and highly mb i l e  teams uho would 
patrol along knoun or suepected in f i l t ra to r  routes, make contact 
with nual farmers and villagers to stimulate sources of infarma- 
tion on in f i l t ra to rs  and a t  the sans time, p-ovlde c m n t i d  
police services to the people. USAID allocated @50,000 in support 
of this program for the acquistion of radios, K-79 grenade Lp.mchers 
and anmumition. The R O E ,  under a special f o r e i g ~  erehange alloca- 
tion, procured shotguns fo r  the m e p  teams. During f i s ca l  year 
1967, the USAID further support this project with an additional 
$l33,000. 'Ihis amount provided a d d i t i d  teleccmamications and 
testing equiprent, together with some training aids. 
Following the dramatic increase in North Korean inf i l t ra-  
tion in 1967, the ROKG developed a comprehensive counter-infil- 
t rat ion plan which involved the police and military establishments, 
together with thei r  respective intelligence services. This resulted 
in a revision of the sweep team concept and evolved into the "Comba t  
Police Forcen plan. By the end of the calendar year, Presidential 
approval was received and initial implenentation of this new concept 
was begun. 
What was t o  be an orderly step-by-step procedure t o  prepare a 
defense fo r  the expected North Korean "spring increase" of agent 
inf i l t ra t ions  abruptly developed into a c r i s i s  as a result of the 
January 1968 near-successful agent attack on President Park's 
residence with the intent of assassinating him. Since that tima, 
counter-infiltration has become a major concern and activi ty within 
the ROKG, cutting across and affecting almost every agency of the 
government. 
The U.S. Government responded t o  this priori ty concern of the 
ROKG by adding $lo0 million in military assistance and $5 mil l ion 
t o  the Public Safety project in May 1968. The $ 5 m i l l i o n  add-on 
ras for  commodities t o  assist the JDP, and especially the Combat  
Police Companies, in strengthening and modernizing selected elemnts, 
with exclusive emphasis on counter-infiltration. 
Revision #6 of the FY 68 Pro& described the project  as  
follows : 
This i s  a cooperative project, under which USOM has 
been a s s i s t i ng  the Korean National Police (KNP) in 
i t s  e f f o r t s  t o  strengthen and modernize i ts  organization 
t o  assure i t s  continued a b i l i t y  t o  maintain in te rna l  
security; enforce law; end preserve order. The s t ructure  
of the KNP has been studied and i s  being reorgauized t o  bring 
about a higher standard of professional competence a t  all  
levels.  
Specifically,  the project  is designed t o  improve the KNPts 
overall  capabi l i ty  t o  counter the acceleration of subver- 
s ive agent i n f i l t r a t i o n  from North Korea and other increased 
threa ts  t o  public safety. The I(NP w i l l  be ass is ted in its 
e f f o r t s  to: 
A) Improve the operation, command control, and efficiency 
of the KNP through the in s t a l l a t i on  of t a c t i c a l  and 
administrative radio systems; 
B) Improve the mobility of the force: 
C) Develop an expanded capabi l i ty  f o r  t ra in ing  police in 
the Police College and the e ight  Provincial Police 
Training Schools; 
D) Improve the present l o g i s t i c  and support system of the 
KNP, placing special  emphasis on the support of counter- 
insurgency uni ts ;  
E) Improve and expand the present IWP e f f o r t s  i n  public 
re la t ions  a c t i v i t i e s  and t o  ac t iva te  new c iv i c  action 
programs i n  the coastal  and r u r a l  areas; 
F)  To provide assistance t o  the Coast Watch Service under 
the jur isdict ion of the KNP. 
The Pro& revision went on t o  state: 
The accomplishment of these objectives involves assistance 
to: 
1 )  Tha 37 Combat Police Companies; 
2) The organized Reserve Tssk Forces within the regular 
police ; 
3) The Seoul Mobile Police Force; 
4 )  m e  National Police College and eight Provincial Police 
Training Schools; 
5) The Seoul MBtropolitan and eight Rovincial radio 
point-to-point radio networks; 
6 )  The development of a system for the protection of 
key strategic installations and facilities; and 
7) The reorganization and modernlaation of the KNP 
armory and field weapons maintenance capability. 
These saum objectives were repeated in subsequent Pro@ 
for Fiscal Years 1969, 1970 and 19n. Additionally, the 1970 and 
1 9 n  ProAgs included another objective: "Improve the patrol, 
search and liaison capabilities of the Korean National Police 
Maritime fleet." 
Status of program objectives at the termination of the Public 
Safety project on June 30, 197l.,will be found fn the section 
entitled "Program Status on Termination" starting on p. 
Inputs t o  the project by major components have been as follows: 
Funding 
The to ta l  funding input to  the Public Safety program since 
FY 1966 through FY 197l amounted t o  $7,192,500. (see Figure 10, 
p . 2  ). The specific program components were funded as follows: 
Technicians-$744,9O@ Commodities-#6,356,300; and Participants- 
$91,300. The commodity component breakdown is as  follows: Com- 
munications equipment-$l,807,406; vehicles and automotive parts- 
$3,160,000; weapons and ammunition-$l,000,000. Miscellaneous items 
such as  training aids, spare parts and excess property accounted for  
the remaining amount of $388,894. (Refer t o  Annex B, p.64 for  de- 
tails on commodity inputs.) 
Technicians 
Ths Staffing Pattern for  the Public Safety project since l a t e  
FP 1966 provided for  seven advisors aa follows: one Chief Public 
Safety advisor, one C o d c a t i o n s  advisor, one Rural advisor, one 
Logistics advisor, and three Area advisors. Two advisors were in 
place during FY 1966, a Training officer and a Surplus Property 
officer. These advisors uere carry-over from the ear l ier  existing 
program. (see Figure 11, p.% ). In real i ty,  the present program 
encompassing any significant degree of technical assistance input 
began in June 1967 with the arr ival  of the Chief Public Safety 
advisor and the Rural advisor. 
FUNDING PROFILE 
FY-1966 t o  FY-19n 
TECHNICIANS 
TOTAL I 744.9 
FY - 1966 
FY - 1967 
FY - 1968 
SOURCE r USAID/KOREA 
41.9 (2) 
53.0 (2)  
132.0 (6) 
Figure 10) funding Profile - 1966-7977 
PARTICIPANTS COMMODITIES TOTAL 
59.1 
238.6 
5,450.0 
13.9 (6) 
18.6 (7) 
- 0 - 
3.3 
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By the end of FY 1968, the remaining f ive advisors had all arrived 
a t  post. (see Figure 11, p. 36). In 1970, under AID'S policy of 
forced personnel reduction worldwide (OPRED), the authorized Public 
Safety staff  of seven technicians in Korea was reduced to five, and 
the Team believes that th i s  reduction, without a corresponding ad- 
justment in the project objectives, accounted for  the shortfalls 
cited in the "Program Status on Terminationn section herein. 
The technical advisory inputs were directed solely t o  the counter- 
inf i l t ra t ion act iv i t ies  of the KNP. 
Chief Public Safety Advisor - The Chief Public Safety Advisor was 
responsible fo r  the management of the project. He was the principal 
USAID link with the KNP in matters effecting project implementation, 
and, within the USAID organization, he reported to the Chief of the 
Public Services Division. Two persons occupied this position during 
the l i f e  of the project: Frank Jessup was assigned as Chief Public 
Safety Advisor from June 1967 to March 1970. He was follovad by 
Robert Bush vho arrived a t  post in May 1970 and because of the 
decision taken by the USAID to terminate the program a t  the end of 
FY 19n, departed post in la te  July 1971. 
Logistics Sumly Bdvisor - 'Ihis position was established to 
provide technical advisory assistance to the K E '  in the establishment 
of a comprehensive logist ical  and supply capability. Charles Mesloh 
was assigned t o  the position fo r  a 23-mont.h period, July 1%8 to June 
197l. Sore degree of success was achieved toward developing an inte- 
grated logistic/supply s y s t e m  by the establishment of tha Bquip%nt 
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Division of the KNP in November 1968. Rowever, the advisor's 
Jhd-of-Tour Raport, dated June 30, 19'7l, indicates that much 
remains t o  be done before the KNF' has a truly effective logistics/ 
supply system. He reports the present system has no one division 
responsible fo r  commodity planning, procurement and distribution. 
Further, there is no central warehouse receiving point. Due t o  
these factors, he reports there is duplication of effort,  lack of 
standardized procedures and waste of manpower and other resources. 
Communtcations Advisor - !his position was occupied by Neal 
Jackson from December 1967 t o  November 1968 when he was replaced 
by Lucien Gormont who arrived a t  post in March 1969. Mr. Gormont 
is expected t o  remain a t  post unt i l  a t  l eas t  December 197l t o  
complete the instaLlation of e q u i p n t  uhich i s  still in the pipe- 
line. In  the Team's view the c o d c a t i o n s '  input in term of both 
equipment and advisory efforts  has been outstandingly successful. 
The KNP embraced the communications effor t  and gave its 100% support 
t o  the project. No small part of the success of this activi ty is 
due-to the high degree of competence and effectiveness of the 
Communications advisor, Lucien Gormont. 
Rural Advisor - This  position was occupied by John Mosely 
from June 1967 t o  May 1970. Ihe position act iv i t ies  were directed 
tovard training, deplogment and effective ut i l izat ion of the C-t 
Police Companies. Advisory efforts  resulted in the develop~ent of 
a curriculum and a paramilitary tac t ics  course a t  the Police 
College where all Combat Police are trained. 
Area Advisor - Area advisors uere required to perfom extensive 
and frequent in4ountr.v travel i n  order t o  ass i s t  the KNP in its 
effor ts  t o  maintain internal security by assuring the operationel 
concepts and techniques of the sweep teams and coast/mountain uatch 
units were being carried out satisfactorily; helping to improw the 
intelligence collecting capability of the KhT and monitoring the 
Combined Command Centers t o  ensure the necessary coordination and 
l iaison w i t h  other ROKG security agencies. A primary unwritten 
responsibility of the Area Advisor was t o  establish close rapport 
with counterpart officers and inculcate the concept of policing 
as  a service t o  the public. He w a s  t o  impress upon h i s  counter- 
parts that  as representatives of their  gow-nt, they should 
create the best possible imege fo r  that  Government, win the loyalty 
of the citizenry and subsequently, derive the benefit of thei r  
support. Three positions were so classified and were encumbered 
as follows: William Ikerd, October 1967 to Nowmber 1968, 
replaced by Raymond Williams uho arrived a t  post Nowmher 1968 and 
departed in May 1970. Earl Goodwin and Roy Hatem occupied the other 
two positions and were a t  post from October 1967 to June 19'7l and 
February 1968 t o  June 1970 respectively. The Area Advisors worked 
with the Provincial Police chiefs in their  respective provinces on 
matters dealing exclusively u i th  counter-infiltration act ivi t ies.  
Ikerd and l a te r  Williams covered the Cholla F'ukto and Cholla Hado 
provinces; Hatem the Kyongsang NaPldo and Kpongsang Pukto areas, and 
Goodwin the three northern provinces of gangvon-Do, Kyonggl-Do and 
Chungchong-Pukto. Upon Hatem's departure from post in Jum 1970, 
Goodwin was assigned t o  Kpngsang N d o  and Pukto provinces. 
Commodities 
Since FY 1966, $6,356,300 waa funded for  commodity support 
of the Public Safety project. C d i t y  components included 
$l, 807,406 for communications equipimnt; $3,160,000 for vehicles 
and automotive parts; $1,000,000 for weapons and d t i o n  and 
$388,894 for miscellaneous i t e m s  such as training aids, spare 
parts and excess property. (Refer t o  Annex B, p.64 for  detai ls  
on commodity inputs. ) 
Participants 
Thirty-six police officers have been trained in the United 
States since 1966. (See Figure 12, p. 40 . Of this  number, 34 are 
still with the IUP. A l l  participants trained a t  the International 
Police Adademy are required t o  serve a midmm of two years a t  the 
Korean National Police College upon their  return. 
Proficiency in the Fhglish language is a factor that  precludes 
a wider selection base for  training in the United S&tes. Police 
officers with whom the Team m t ,  lamented the fac t  that English 
language training was so di f f icul t  t o  obtain and therefore they 
were unable t o  compete fo r  the available training opportunities 
a t  the International Police Acadelqg (PA). lhis problem was recog- 
nized by the Coin, L e i s t e r  team who conducted an assessmsnt of the 
program in 1969, and recommended steps that  could be taken to deal 
with the problem. (Refer Coin, Iaister report of November 1969, 
p. 3, reconrmendation 3.) 'he Team feels  that  the iawstnmnt mede 
by the U.S. in the participant training area is one of the most 
constructive low cost investments that  has been and could continue 
t o  be made. It was indeed gratifying t o  note the "esprit  de corpsn 
and dedication that  exist  among the IF'A graduates with whom the 
Team came in contact. The recammndation section of this report 
urges the U.S. partioxpant training program t o  conthue despite 
the absence of a Public Safety project including advisors in Korea. 
OPS eponsored participants for U.S. training from July 1, 1965 thr- 
June 30, 1 W :  
Senior 
Fiscal Year Course 
FY 1966 
PY 1967 
FY 1968 1 
FY 1969 1 
FY 1970 1 
FY 19'A 2 
General 
Course 
Police Technical 
Executive Specialist Totals 
1 (FBI) 5 
2 
1 (FBI) 7 
3 7 
2 1 (PBI) ll 
- - 4 
SOURCE: IPA 
Figure 72) Korean Police Trained in U. S. 
Status of Objectives at Program Termination 
Status of 0b.iectives a t  Termination of Public Safety Proiect 0x1 
June 30. 1971: 
The Team believes that the project goals as  recited in the 
preceding section have, for the most part, been met and the project 
has been largely successful. Inputs in terms of advisory services 
and commodities have been most significant in relation t o  outputs, 
primarily in the areas of mobility and communications as- relate 
t o  +he counter-infiltration activi t ies of tb KNP. The hroad 
sector goal purpose of the project as se t  out in PAR n-7  dated 
1/19/71 is  as f ollovs: "To assist  in the maintenance of a free 
and viable society where tb daily vocations can be carved out 
without fear of duress, retaliation or reprisal against Korean 
workers or his family by strengthening the ROKG abi l i ty  t o  pro- 
vide internal c iv i l  security, t o  be accomplished by upgrading the 
KNP capability in counter-infiltration.n In measuring the project 
accomplishments then, the Team had t o  relate the inputs s t r i c t l p  
t o  the counter-infiltration activi t ies of the KNP since the entire 
thrust of the project was in this one area. 
A) Tactical and administrative radio wstemg: 
The objectives of this activity were designed t o  improve the 
operations, ccmmd control d overall efficiency of the KNP througb 
the development of tac t ical  programs and the institution of radio 
systems. Included were eight Provincial point-to-point networks, 
the Seoul Metropolitan Mobile Force (407 man) radio system; a 
tac t ica l  radio system for the country-wide 9,000 man b r g e n c y  
Task Force; an FM tac t ica l  radio s y s t e m  for the Combat Police 
Force and a Provincial Police station-to-police box net. Mdi- 
tionally, a radio technicians training school capable of training 
100 junior and 10 senior technicians each year was t o  be activated. 
Announced objectives in this area have been largely met,  and 
while pipeline delivery of radio equipment requires extension of 
technical advisory assistance for  six months beyond project ter- 
mination date t o  December 1 9 n ,  this element of the project objec- 
t ives has for  all intents and purposes, achieved its goal. KNP 
communications f ac i l i t i e s  have been improved, radio repair and 
maintenance schools have been established and c d i t i e s  provi- 
ded have expanded and upgraded the police telecolmmmications 
system t o  the point where it is one of the best netuorks in the 
country, linking all provinces t o  KNP headquarters and providing 
sub-nets for  quick-reaction tact ical  units and police box-to- 
station t ies.  The accomplishments realized in this effor t  can 
be attributed t o  the U.S. contribution of technical advisory 
services together w i t h  commodity assistance coupled w i t h  ade- 
quate ROKG funding and personnel support. (Refer to Annex B, 
p. 64 fo r  further details.) 
B) Improve the mobility of the force: 
~ i n c a  1966, $3,160,000 was obligated for procurement of 
607 new vehicles and spare parts while 279 vehicles of various 
makes were obtained from U.S. excess property sources. The 
t o t a l  input through U.S. procurement and excess property ac- 
quisitions aw,unted t o  886 vehicles which constitutes over 35% 
of the KNP f l e e t  of 2,500 vehicles. A s  a result of this input, 
the mobility of the Combat Police Force, k r g e n c y  Task Force, 
Seoul Wtropolitan Mobile Force and other functional units of 
the KNP w a s  considerably improved. It should be noted that  279 
vehicles provided from excess property were for the most part 
old, rehabilitated units. 
While the limited scope of the program and therefore of 
the evaluation, did not permit the Team's aesesament of overall 
KNP transportation needs, it i a  reasonable t o  assum that  the 
279 rehabilitated vehicles are now in need of replacement. 
C) Develop an erpanded capability fo r  t r W  police: 
While project act ivi ty pursued th i s  objective to the 
degree possible, the inputs vere too minimal t o  realize the 
specific goals reflected in the various ProAgs. The 19M Pro& 
stated that the National Police College and eight Provincial 
Training Schools vere t o  be improved and expanded t o  the point 
where they would have the capability t o  train 15,000 studenta 
rnual ly .  The 1 9 n  ProAg stated they should be developed to the 
point where they would be capable of meeting Korea's t o t a l  train- 
Fog requirement fo r  the KNl'. 
Neither of these specific goals have been met  and f r o m  
briefings received and observations made a t  the Police College and 
F'rovincial Raining School in Cholla Pukto, it is  apparent that  
the KNP t ra in ing  in s t i t u t i ons  even with considerable e q a n s i m  of 
ex is t ing  f a c i l i t i e s  w i l l  be hard-pressed t o  meet bas ic  r ec ru i t  
t ra in ing  requirements alone over the next f ive  years. 
The KNP with an annual a t t r i t i o n  fac tor  of 5% representing 
2,250 men, has projected a 36,800 man increase over the  next f ive 
years a t  the ra te  of 7.360 men per  year. 'Ihis represents an annual 
bas ic  r ec ru i t  t ra in ing  comnitment of 9,610 men per  year. I f  the  
Police College and eight  Provincial Schools were t o  suspend a l l  
in-service refresher and specialized t ra in ing  and operate a t  
f u l l  capacity year round, they would s t i l l  not .be able t o  produce 
the number of r ec ru i t s  required t o  meet the desired goal of 9,610 
men annually. As a matter of fac t ,  they could only produce a 
l i t t l e  over ha l f  t h i s  number. 
With a dormitory capacity of 560 a t  the Police Col les .  
and 150 a t  each of the e ight  Provincial Police Schools, three 
16-week r e c n d t  classes during the course of a year would produce 
only 5,280 recru i t s  - a f a r  cry from the desired t o t a l  and pro- 
duced a t  the  s ac r i f i ce  of the all inportant in-service t ra in ing  
requirements of the KNP. 
'Ihe whole t ra in ing  s t ruc ture  i n  the KNP appears t o  be 
without any central  direction,  control o r  colmnand. The various 
t ra in ing  uni ts  and f a c i l i t i e s  (including Seoul Metropolitan, 
Pusan City and Headquarters Training Division, i n  addition t o  
those mentioned above) seem t o  exist  as  separate en t i t i es  with 
attendant duplication of effort,  no standardization of administra- 
tion, and varying levels of student discipline and academic 
standards. The need within the KNP for  a cohesive organizational 
structure such as a Police Education Buraau t o  which all training 
elements are subordinated is obvious. 
D) Improve the .present logist ic  and support m t e m :  
This objective m e t  soms degree of success. W i t h  a Public 
Safety logistics/supply technician assigned to  the Equipment 
Division, some improvements in the KNP supply system were realized. 
Receiving and distribution procedures were improved, record 
keeping became more accurate and the flow of spare parts t o  the 
f ie ld  was expedited. Additionally, a procedure for  the acquisition 
of U.S. excess property was developed for  continued use of the KW. 
While these improvemsnts resulted i n  increased efficiency, 
the tenure of th i s  advisor's assignment a t  post (1968-1971) did 
not permit the accomplishment of the desired institutionalizing 
of the system. Under the KNF' logistics/supply system, them is 
no one division responsible fo r  commodity planning, procuremant 
and distribution. The Equipment Division is responsible for  all 
AID-provided commodities, all weapons, ammunition, un i fom,  
vehicles, vehicle spare parts and the acquisition of excess cam- 
modities. A l l  other itams authorized are procured, received and 
distributed by the concerned division or buraau. Ilue t o  this 
arrangement, the KNP does not have a central warehouse receiving 
point and consequently, there is  duplication, lack of procedural 
standards and waste of manpower. 
E) Expand and improve public relations and civic action: 
Public Safety staff  assisted i n  obtaining public relations 
films from USIS for  use by the RNP in each of the nine provinces 
and these films have been used extensively by the police. Beyond 
this very m h h d  effort,  there have peen no other inputs in pursuit 
of the announced objective. 
F) Provide assistance t o  the Coast Watch Service: 
This objective was met  through the advisory technical assist- 
ance, training, and commodity inputs which assisted the Combat  
Police Companies and the 9,000 man reserve Taak Force of the KNP. 
The ProAgs announce that  the above objective would be pursued 
by assisting the following I(NP elements: 
(1) The 37 C o m b a t  Police ComDauies: 
This force developed as a result of refinements in the 
original "Sweep Tean concept. From a l l  indications, 
it appears that U.S. assistance and ROKG contributions 
have resulted in a wll-organized, well-trained, wll- 
equipped, and strategically deployed KNP element carrying 
out its duties and responsibilities in an effective manner. 
(2) The O r d z e d  Resem Task Force: 
This 9,000 man force is  composed of specially trained 
regular police personnel uho perform n@ law and 
order functions un t i l  an emergency situation develops 
a t  which they assume combat un i t  ccafigvratione. 
While U.S. assistance has p r d d e d  some training, in- 
creased mobility and commrmieations capability for the 
force, the Team had no opportunity t o  observe elements in unit 
stature. Consequently, no assessment of their  effectiveness as 
a quick back-up force could be made. However, police off ic ia ls  
report this force has proven to  be responsive and eff icient  
when called upon. 
(3) The Seoul Mobile Police Force: 
This specially trained and equipped force of approximately 500 
men is maintained in an ever-ready s ta te  of preparedness and can 
be committed immediately within the Seoul Wtropolitan area in 
emergency situations. U.S. assistance provided some training, 
increased mobility and c o ~ c a t i o n s  capability to  this unit. 
While the Team had no opportunity t o  view their  effectiveness 
as  a quick reaction back-up unit, of f ic ia l  W s y  reports indi- 
cate this un i t  performed exceedingly wll  in the past during 
periods of student disorders. 
( 4 )  The National Police Collem and Eight Provincial l'raininr! Schools: 
This subject has been treated in "Cn above. 
( 5 )  The Seoul Mstro and Einht Provincial Point-to-Point Radio %'ateme: 
These radio system emerge as  an outstanding contribution to the 
overall improved efficiency of the KNP. 
( 6 )  Develop a S y s t e m  for  Protection of Key Strateaic Faci l i t ies  and 
Installations: 
This is more in the nature of an "objectiven rather than a I(RP 
unit  t o  be assisted. In any event, the Warn was unable to find 
any evidence of assistance t o  the KNP in th i s  area and the need 
for  such a comprehensive plan continues t o  exist.  
(7) The F l eo rdza t ion  and Modernization of the glJP Amoq: 
A ccrmbination of U.S. and ROKG contributiom realfaed 
a major success in the accomplishment of this objective. 
The KNP acquired land, budgeted construction funds and 
purchased reloading equipment and supplies. A neu 
armory in Seoul vas completed in December 1970. Weapons 
repair tools and spare parts rere procured through Public 
Safety commodity programs. Three shop van trucks =re 
procured from U.S. excess, reconditioned and outfitted 
by the KNP t o  provide mobile reapone repair and maintenance 
service to f ie ld  units  in r u r a l  areas of the Republic. 
They becam operational in February 197l. 
( 8 )  Improve the Patrol. Search and Liaison Cawbil i t ies  of 
the Korean National Police Maritime Fleet: 
In &Idition t o  this general objective announced in both 
the 1970 and 197l Pro&, the Implemntation Schedule in 
Annex B of the 1970 Pro& contains the folloulng: 
"Increase the counter-infiltration capability of 10 
Korean police marit- patrol c ra f t  by equipping the 
boats with radar and searchlights. This equiprent, 
mounted on W-bu i l t  vessels, uwld provide the means 
fo r  electronic detection of enemy wssels on sea and 
island search operations. Both are essential in the 
defense of the areas designated aa the responsibility 
of the police." 
Despite the announced objectiw, the only assistance 
provided t o  the Marit ime Police outside of participant 
training consisted of two sea-worthy bacgee acquired 
from U.S. excess property in 1970. 
Shortfalls in reaching project gods  in police training, key 
strategic f ac i l i t i e s  and installations, and Maritime Police may be 
attributad to' the USAID1s fai l ing to accept Plmding and staffing 
level recommendations made in the Goin-hister report of H m h r  
1969 (cited earl ier)  together w i t h  a reduction in the level of 
Public Safety advisory assistance from a planned level of seven 
through FY197l t o  an actual level of f ive during FP 19n. Con- 
comitant adjustments in project scope were not effected and the 
advisory effor t  was spread too thin to a c c q l i s h  all objectives 
of the project. 
OBSERVATIONS 
In assessing the effectiveness of the project and e d u a t i q  
its attdmmnt of stated objectives, it became obvious to the 'bam 
that the USAID has not, in fact, ever had a &tan+live Public 
Safety project involved in institutionallsing the Korean National 
Police (KNP). 
The project from 1966 vaa a discrete project. Although its 
objective was broadly stated, its focus was narrov and tied 
specifically to the counter-infiltration activities of the QJP, 
and the technical assistance inputs =re restricted solely towsrd 
meeting that end. While the counter-infiltration activity of the I[NP 
function is most important, constituting about 65% of its total 
effort, it does not of itself contribute fully tovard making the 
force a viable entity within the social and economic fabric of the 
society. Other equally important considerations bear on the role 
of the police as a vital element of government in a developing 
society. The announced F'roAg goal of improving the police image 
should have been, in the Team's oplnion, provided d t h  more support 
and pursued vith vigor. 
The task of improving the image of the police must start vith 
the development of efficient and capable institutions dthin tha 
police structure. From its limited observations, the Team concludes 
the KNP needs development in several areas of police operations such 
as administration, organisation, effective use of resources, police 
planning, patrol operations, traffic, logistics, records, crime 
prevention, training and manpover utilization. Of these, possibly 
manpower utilixation is of prime importance. In less  than tM 
years, the force strength increased from 43,172 in October 1969 
t o  44,908 in July 19n; and additional planned increases of the 
KNP for  the years 197l through 1976 total 36,800. (See Figure 
3, P- 17 -1 
Given the projected population growth of 1.5% mr the next 
few years, Korea w i l l  have a population of approximately 35,254,823 
by 1976 and a police force strength of approximately 81,800 u i th  
a police/population ra t io  of approximately 2.3/1000 as opposed t o  
the present 1.3/1000 ratio. 
The Team is not convinced that adequate attention has been 
given by the KUP t o  the budgetary implications of such a manpowr 
increase since the police budget has averaged only 4.4% of the 
National budget since 1967 (See Figure 13, p. 52 ), and personal 
services has historically accounted for from 73 to 76% of the 
total KNP budget. (See Figure l.4, p. 53 ) Thus, the Team 
comes back t o  the question of the effectiveness of the manag8ment 
of the KNP Force resources. W i t h  only 24 or 27% of the KUP 
budget allocated t o  administration and capital investment for, 
say, mobility and c d c a t i o n s  equipment alone, it would follow 
that the KNP w i l l  be hard-pressed t o  m e t  the demands for increased 
police services without ei ther a significant increase in its t o w  
budget or indirect inputs from outside the Government. The rapid 
growth rate of the Korean GNP during the past five years (See Figure 
15, p. 54 ) has placed stresses on the Government for increased 
public service and consequently, there is strong campetition among 
Research on the Administration of the Korean National Police 
conducted by Korean Research Inst i tute of Public Administration and 
USOM-1968 (D. 165). 
ROKG NATIONAL BUDGET ALLOCATION TO KNP 
Figures in won; 100 won = $0.36. 
Fiscal Year National Bud.eet KNP Budget Percentaaes 
19n 524,247,8~,000 23,474,503,000 4.478 
1970 L46,273,000,000 19,117,563,500 4.2M 
1969 370,532,000,000 15,493,200,000 4.188 
1968 262,064,000,000 12,866,500,000 4.908 
1967 180,932,000,000 7,754,684,200 4.29% 
Prepared by USAID/KOREA, 7/12/n 
Figure 13) ROKG/KNP Budget - 1967-1971 
SfCRW 
KOREAh' NATIONbL POLICE BUDGBT 
FOR FY 1 9 n  
I t e m  Description APPROVEL PROPOSED APPROVED 
- 
FY 1970 FY 197l FY 197l 
.l Police Unit Operation 13,M0,320,000 15,433,102,000 15,5U,5CQ,000 
2. Equipment and Cormrmnications 816,7l6,000 1,009,838,000 1,009,838,000 
Management 
A. Quipment Management 195&3,000 180,169,000 180,169,000 
B. Inshore Boat Operation 152,%2,200 162,540,000 162,540,000 
C. Aircraft Operation 32,516,100 34,961,000 34,961,000 
D. Communications Management 436,094,700 632,168,000 632,168,000 
3. C r i m e  Investigation Activities 727,ll8,300 834,216,000 834,216,000 
A. Investigation Activities 590,891,000 687,032,000 687,032,000 
B. Identification Activities 84,mbOOo 532,055,000 92,055,000 
C. National Scientific Crime 51,518,300 55,129,000 55,129,000 
Laboratory 
4.  Fire Fighting Administcation 30,178,400 180,963,000 180,%3,000 
. Fire Fighting 20,625,100 175,360,000 175,360,000 
-. Civilian dnti-Air Raid 9,553,300 5,603,000 5,603,000 
5. Police School 120,806,900 U5,182,000 U5,182,000 
A. Police Collee 91,541,000 U,319,000 U,319,000 
B. Provincial Police School 29,265,000 30,863,000 30,863,000 
6. Police Hospital 68,988,000 84,344,000 84,344,000 
7. Combat Police Forces 1,556,911,400 2,165,526,000 2,165,526,000 
8. Maritime Police 1,124,420,000 1,299,012,000 1,358,951,000 
9. Ho~land Reserve Force 315,6d7,400 7U,234,000 662,234,000 
10. Private Police 520,729,500 395,000,000 395,000,000 
11. Counter Cormrmnist Intelligence 668,978,300 8L6,178,000 846,178,000 
Activities 
G. ~oreign  fairs Police 
Activities 
Figure l4) KNP Budget Breakdown - 1970-1971 
ROKG DEFEWSE BUDGET 
Unit: Billion Won 
.. 
~ i s c a l  Year National Budget 
i 9 n  524.2 
1970 446.2 
1969 370.5 
1968 262.0 
1967 180.9 
Note: 4 - Original Budget 
- Final  Budget 
ROK GNP 
Fiscal Year 
1970 
1969 
1968 
1967 
1966 
Defense Bud& p s r c e n w  
127.8 4 21.38 
100.5 k/ 22-52 
84.4 22.79 
64.7 21. 69 
49.6 27.41 
GNP - Current *ice GNP a t  constent 1965 Price 
2,561.95 4 1,433.47 S/ 
Figure 75) GNP Growth Rate 
all elements of the Gcvmmment fo r  available resources. 
With a current annual population grovth rate of appro;rimately 
2% (See Figure 16, p. 56 ) coupled with the influx of the population 
t o  the urban areas (See Figure 17, p. 57 ), the police burden of 
maintaining l a w  md order will  become staggering, unless some 
strong effor t  i s  made now t o  plan for strengthening the police as an 
institution. 
An overriding factor which fmther complicates the process 
of an orderly development of the KNP as a viable institution is 
the vital role it plays in  the maintenance of internal aecruity. 
Police officials  have indicated that  about 65% of thei r  
effort,  particularly in the three southern prcrvlnces, is devoted 
t o  counter-infiltration activities. This activity of the police 
has become its greatest single effort,  and rightly so. ht because 
of this w r y  fact,  the normal law and order function of the police, 
in relation to i ts  responsibilities t o  the public, has had to taLe 
a lover priority. A sustained continuance of this posture without 
increased inputs t o  the police public service act iv i t ies  must have 
the consequence of eventual diminution of police public relatianships 
with its attendant adverse impact on the effectiveness of the police 
in its c r i t i ca l  role in the meintenance of internal security. 
While the Team was not in a position t o  ezanine, in any 
depth, the police inst i tut ion as a whole, it s u b i t s  that it is 
unreasonable to assume that  the KIP has reached the point of 
self-sufficiency and no longer hes a need for  contimaed U.S. assisL 
ance. In considering the magnitude of planned U.S. assistance to 
3.08 per year 
2.9 
2.8 
ESTIMATED FOWLATION INCREASE 
++x Between 19bh and 1966, there vas 
a net increase of over 13 million 
people, or *st 84 percent. In 
1966, uhen the l a s t  complete census 
was taken, the population stood a t  
29,207,856 and was increasing a t  
the ra te  of about 2.8% per year. 
Since then, however, the r a t e  o f  
natural increase has been declin- 
ing steadily and rapidly to about 
2.4 percent. 
Future population growth projections are based on a further 
diminishing scale, s tabil izing a t  1.5% as the ef fec ts  of AID'S 
family planning program bear on the problem. 
The following represents estimated increases from 1966 to 
1976 based on this diminishing scale: 
1966-Population a t  l a s t  complete census 29,207,856 
1966-1967 with 2.4% p n t h :  Increase t o  29,908,8WI 
1967-1968 with 2.32 growth: Increase t o  30,596,7h7 
1968-1969 %nth 2.2% growth: Increase t o  31,270,031 
1969-1970 with 2.1% growth: Increase to 31,926,702 
1970-1971 with 2.M growth: Increase t o  32,565,236 
1971-1972 with 2.N growth: Increase t o  33,216,5-'b9 
1972-1973 with 1.5% growth: Increase to  33,7l4,788 
1973-197b with 1.5% growth: Increase t o  3!i,220 ,509 
1974-1975 with 1.5% growth: Increase to 3hJ733,816 
1975-1$76 w i t h  1.5% groutl~: Increase to 35,254,823 
9 R ~ G  Bureau of Census 4mb 
*> Area Handbook for Rupublic of Korea - 1969 
56 
mure 16) Population Expansion - 1960-1916 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
URBAN POPULATION INCREASES 
From 1966 t o  1970, major c i t i e s  in South Korea shoved en 
average annual population increase of approximately 8%. The fol- 
lowing table i l lus t ra tes  population increases i n  these c i t i e s  
during the four year period: 
POPULATION ** POPULATION ANNUAL FOUR YlWl 
CITY 
-
I N  1966 I N  1970 INCREASE INCREASE 
Seoul 3,805,261 5,555,581 11.5% 46% 
Suwon 128,352 170,708 8.3% 33% 
Tae gu 847,949 1,085,373 7.0% 28% 
Kwangju 404,459 501,529 6.0% 24% 
Area Handbook for the Republic of Korea - 1969 
** Estimate based on percentage of population expansion as  
reflected in Figure 16, p. . 
Fifure 17) Urban Trends of Population 
the ROgC military establishment during the coming years, it is 
d i f f i cu l t  t o  understand the rationale leading to the conclusion 
that  the E[NP haa no need for  further U.S. assistance. The KW 
plays a c r i t i c a l  role in, and interfaces with, almost every aspect 
of the social, economic and security d e w l o p n t  of the country. 
It must be a competent, reliable and responsive institutionalised 
element of the g o v e m n t  i f  the country is to continue to make 
strong econumic gains and then hold these gains. 
In assessing the posture of the KNF' a t  the conclusion of the 
Public Safety program, particularly in relationship to its 
ab i l i ty  to  carry on those act ivi t ies previously support by K D ,  
the was struck by the f ac t  that the word of the project's 
termination evidently had only recently f i l tered dovn t o  the 
action officers. Without exception, the police off ic ia ls  con- 
tacted by the Team, including the Director General, expressed 
profound amazement and almost disbelief concerning the termination 
of U.S. assistance to the KNP. While it is known that  R?W off ic ia ls  
were orally informed of the project's planned termination date, 
the Team has been unable to find any off ic ia l  written notification 
t o  BNP off ic ia ls  that  the project was, i n  fact,  t o  be terminated 
on June 30, 197l. It may be argued that  the FY 1% Pro& clearly 
s e t  forth the termination date, and this in effect  constitutes 
written notification. The RoAgs, however, are executed between 
the USAID and the Korean Economic Planning Board, and most 
off ic ia l  correspondence concerning project ac t iv i t ies  follows 
that  channel. Not one single KNF' of f ic ia l  ras a signatory t o  the 
Pro&* 
Therefore, it is the Team's opinion that  the KNP had only recently 
bacom ful ly  cognisant of the f ac t  that  the project was definitely 
terminating as of June 30, 1m. The absence of a KNP developed 
plan for absorbing formerly AID-mpported act iv i t ies  Further 
supports this view. 
"Why is the U.S. Government abandoning its assistance to the 
police?" was a question repeatedly asked of Team members. The 
Team's response was that  the U.S. was not abandoning its assistance 
t o  the KNP but that  the goals agreed upon by both the U.S. and 
Korean Governments had been successfully met, and within the 
time frame specified by the U.S. and ROKG agreement. In discuss- 
ing the project's termination with the Director General and his 
, 
staff, it was their  consensus that  many deficiencies existed within 
the police organization and that they he5 planned for continued 
assistance t o  help them in meeting these deficiencies. 
The Director General indicated that  he intended to follow 
the matter up by requesting the U.S. Government t o  send a team 
of experts t o  Korea t o  study the KNP in order t o  develop a 
comprehensive long range plan to be used by the KIP a8 a guide 
fo r  its future d e v e l o ~ n t .  He considered such a plan to be 
vital. 
Recommendations 
The Team is  not sure of the present degree of viabil i ty 
of the KNP, but this is suspect because of the obvious lack of 
institutionalization that  is essential t o  force viabil i ty in 
any organization as  large and as complex as the KNP. Conse- 
quently, the Team suggests that  consideration bo given to  an 
in-depth study of the KNP as an institution. 
Such a study would provide both the U.S. and ROKG Governments 
with a factual and substantive document from which informed 
decisions could be made as  to  the present capabilities and future 
needs of the KNP. 
Reconanendations: 
1. That a survey of the KNP be undertaken as soon as possible 
t o  determine its strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities t o  sustain 
i t se l f  as a viable inst i tut ion in relation t o  both its security 
and law and order responsibilities. Such a study should assess the 
relative importance of the KNP in the social and economic sectors 
as  well as in the area of internal security, and relate th i s  to the 
developmental ac t iv i t ies  of the ROKG. 
2. Participant training a t  the Intarnational Police Academy should 
be continued in to  the foreseeable future. Also, specialized t raining 
in areas such as  maritime police, logistics,  t r a f f ic  managament and 
communications should be encouraged. Currently, s5z English general 
courses and one senior officer course are offered each year a t  the 
IPA; ideally, a minimum of two officers should attend each class. 
Annex A - American and Korean Officials Met  by Team 
SECRET 
II_ 
American Officials met by Mr. Finn & Mr. Cretecos 
Mr. William J. Porter - Ambassador 
I&-. Michael 8.. 8. Adler - Mission Director 
I&-. ~thos G. Revelle - AD/P 
Mr. Richard L. Goodrich - D/C, PSD 
Mr. William McClure - 11s 
I&-. John Richardson - Special Assistant to Ambassador 
Mr. Robert Bodraghy - Mr. Richardson's Ikputy 
public Safetr 
Mr. Robert N. Bush - 
Mr. Charles F. &sloh - 
Mr. Earl N. Goodwin - 
Mr. Lucien V. Cormont - 
Chief Public Safety Advisor 
Logistics Advisor 
Area Advisor 
Telecomnrmnications Advisor 
Kman National Police Officials met by Mr. Pinn 8 Mr. Cretecos 
Ceneral Headq~(~~tars :  
Chang, Dong Shik, Director General, DW 
'Kim, Bong Kym, Supt. General, Chief Foreign Affairs 
Ifgung, Jung Seok, Supt, 3rd Foreign Affairs Section 
Eauiument Division: 
Ilyon, Oh Kyung, Supt General, Chief Equipment Division 
Lee, Ki Il, Sr. Supt, Weapons and Vehicle Section 
Kim, Min Hee, Sr. Supt, E q u i p n t  Section 
Oh, Chin Yung, Capt, Headquarters Garage 
Hational Police C o l l e ~ :  
Choi, Suk Won, Sr. Supt General, Conm~andant Police College 
gim, Won Bae, Supt General, Deputy Commandant Police Collega 
Park, Yong Kyu, Sr. Supt, Chief Instructor's Department 
Kim Eul Chon, 9. Supt, Training Officer 
Chon, Kae Hvan, Administration Officer 
Conarmnications: 
Yoo, Tae Smg, Supt General, Chief Cammications 
Kim, Jung Han, Capt, Radio Planning Officer 
109 C o m b a t  Police Co &Sta f f  Co Co - Capt. Lee, Scan gi 
Cholla Pukto hovince: 
Suh, Jae Keun, Supt General, Director 
Moon, Il Su, Sr. Supt, Chief Security 
gim, Chul H i ,  9'. Supt, Chief, Intelligence 
Chung, Sam Shik, Supt, Deputy Cormrandant, Provlnce Training School 
Maritime Police: 
b e ,  Chong Hak, Coxmuandant 
H a r ,  Sam Shik, Deputy Colmnandant 
Chon, Jang Keun, Chief, Administration Division 
Lee, Hui Cham, Chief, Intelligence and Invastigation Division 
Suh, In, Chief, Mntenance Division 
Song, J in  Seok, Chief, Communication Division 
Pusan Citv Police: 
Kim, Chin Seok, Chief, Administration Division 
Lee, Joon Bong, Chief, Public Safety Division 
Kim Hyung Jin, Chief, Security Division 
Chung, Sang Kok, Commander 213th Combat Police Cokpny 
Chung, Tae Jung, Chief Foreign Affairs Division 
Park, Man Chong, Director Pusan City 
Kyun~sang Nam Do Provincial Police: 
Lee, Byung Joo, Chief, Administration Division 
Lim, Ju Yong, Chief, Security Division 
Park, Jang Won, Chief, Intelligence Division 
Lee, Jeong Su, Chief, Public Safety Division 
Park, Yoo Su, Chief, Investigation %vision 
Cho, Sun K i ,  Chief, Communication Division 
Annex B - Major Commodity Inputs 
Telecommunications 
v 
Since FY-1966 tba objectives of the Public Safety Tele- 
crmmunications Progrrrm have been consistent, i.e., t o  msist the 
Korean National Police (XNP)  in its effor ts  t o  strengthen and 
mcdiwniee its organization t o  assure its continued abi l i ty  t o  
maintain internal security, enforce the law aod preserve order. 
Specifically, the Crmmunication Program waa designed t o  
improve the KNF"s capability t o  counter the  inf i l t ra t ion of North 
Korean agents and other threats t o  publLc safety by providing 
communication equipment and technical advisory assistance as  
FT 1966 - Provide $225,444 t o  finance the costs, 
excluding transportation, of portable two-way camnun- 
ications equipment for ROK (~epubl ic  of Korea) 
anti-infiltratbon "sweep terns" and fixed two-way 
cammunications equipment for  instal lat ion of in te l l i -  
gence gathering centers. 
FII 1962 - Provide $94,608 for procurement of cammuu- 
ications and crmmunications testing equipment and 
sane training aids. Provision was also made for  the 
services of a comunications advisor. 
FII 1968 - To improve the  operation, c o d  control, 
and efficiency of the KNX' through installation or 
tac t ical  and a ~ s t r s t i v e  radio system. 
Revision #6 of RoAg number 644-8001 provided fuuds 
in the amount of $l,177,261 for  communications out 
of a $5 million supporting assistance add-on. Ihe 
equipment was t o  provide communications for: 
a )  Combat Police Comuanieg (formarly houri as 'aueep 
teams') - To be equipped with FM tac t ical  radios for 
cperational command and control. 
b) Reserve Task Forces - Reserve Task Forces are t o  
be equipped with communications equipent. 
c )  Seoul Mobile Police Force - To be provided cammun- 
ications e q u i p n t .  
d) Provincial Communications Systems - Provide equip- 
ment t o  police stations t o  improve the i r  c a m a d  and 
control radio nets. 
4. FP 1969 - A t o t a l  of $54,066 was provided for  cammi- 
cations equipment t o  consolidate the commications 
abi l i ty  of the Combat Police Force, in the l igh t  of 
the experience developed through one par of operation; 
strengthen the maintenance capability of the pravin- 
c i a l  repair shops; equip maintenance training fac i l i t i es .  
5. FP 1970 - Replace obsolete equipent and expsml the 
radio f ac i l i t i e s  of nine provincial networks and estab- 
l i s h  five d6itional radio repa+ shops. To accomplish 
t h i s  objective, w , l 0 9  was funded. 
6. 1PP 1 9 n  - Assist the KN3 the radio techniciens training 
school so that  it will  be capable of training 100 
junior technicians and 15 senior technicians per 
par. The amount of $111,918 was M e d  fo r  SSB 
transceivers, electronic maintenance equipnent. 
.. 
Since FY 1966, then, $1,807,406 along with technical advi- 
sory assistance has been funded for  the communications component 
of the project. This provided funds for: 1837 0FS,h!-l; I489 oFS/FM-5; 
106 Hallicrafters SSB transceivers model SBT-r)B; 40 Hallicrafters VHF/AM 
(air-bground) transceiver model HT-ZB; 750 Hentron Co. SSB transceiver 
model C-Tran-15. A l l  equipent, with the exception of 285 SSB transceivers, 
1/2 l o t  of related spare parts, and 1/2 l o t  of installation matarials, had 
arrived prior to  July 15, 1971; approximately 20 installatione (out of 720) 
have been completed. 
Each of the communications program act ivi t ies  as defined above 
has been accomplished with the exception of the police box-to-station 
SSB link that i s  to be completed by December 197l. Specifically, the 
following accomplishments have been achieved: 
The 23 "Sweep Teams" planned f o r  i n  1966 were activated in 
1957 af ter  having been renamed "Combat Police Forcen companies. Each 
company was equipped with 26 OFS/FM radios (13 W1 end 13 Ef-5), as  
well as vi th sufficient anciliary equipnent to: 
--Provide a self sufficient, independent company comunications 
rknction, allowing each of i t s  compnents (company Commander, 10 squads 
end 10 platoons), 'k remain in contact with each other and with the Company 
HQ during an ~ p r a t i o n ,  and within a radius of et  leas t  53 miles. 
This tacticol,  very flerzble, network offered immediate r e d t s :  
A numixr of roonthly r e p x t s  witten i n  1967 a!lc! early 
1968 point out severcil instances whereby enemy agents were captured 
or ki l led through the new tact ics  hfforded by the improved 
police communications ability. 
lhe t e s t  equipment procured in 196'7 modernieed repair faci l i -  
t i e s  located in each of the Provincial capitals. Such f ac i l i t i e s  
eldsted prior t o  the introduction of t h i s  phase o%:the program 
but were very primitive and poorly equipped. Only three, Seoul, 
Taegu and Chonju, were capahle of a l i t t l e  more than j u s t  elemen- 
tary repair work, and of these only S e ~ d  had enough t e s t  equip 
ment t o  cope efficiently with 70% of the required repairs. 
Test equipment input allowed: 
-The Seoul Repair Shop t o  cope with 99% of all types of 
repairs .- :ated t o  OPS/FM equipment. 
--Taegu and Chonju t o  cope efficiently wi th  70% of all 
repairs needed in their  respective provinces. 
-The remainbg five provincial repair shops t o  cope dth 
50% of a l l  repairs needed'in thei r  respective provinces. 
Training was given in 1967 and 1968 t o  40 teclmiclans, 
detailing the use of t h i s  t e s t  equipment and its application t o  
OPS/FM radio transceivers. 
A communications advisor, Neal Jackson vas assigned t o  the 
Public Safety project i n  Korea and mrived  on December 13, 1967. 
During FY 1968, an additiozxal 1,468 OPS/FM-1 ad 957 
OPS/FM-5 were procured with the funds.msde available that  f i sca l  
year. Also obtained were 100 Single Side &udd (SSB Hallicrafters 
Model SBT-208) Transceivers. With t h i s  equipmsnt, the follouk;: 
was accomplished: slw 
--Additional communications equipment was provided t o  the 14 
newly created Combat Police Companies. (Total 37 Combat Police 
Companies. ) 
-Approximately 160 Police Task Force Teams were equippea 
with sufficient radios t o  allow each task force t o  operate effectively 
while fielded for a counter-infiltration operation, and t o  main- 
tain contact with tb Police Station t o  which it is attached. 
--A to ta l  of 221 O P S P  transceivers and associated equipmant 
was provided t o  the Seoul Mobile Police Force, enabling t h i s  branch 
of the Metropolitan Police t o  coordinate special operations ( traff ic,  
r i o t  control, VIP displacement and control, etc.) with other units 
and HQ. 
--A t o t a l  of eight point-to-point networks was established 
between all rural police stations and thei r  respective Provinicial 
capitals. Whenever practical, these networks vere established with 
VHF equipuent; when the topography of the terrain prohibited this 
approach, HF'/SSB equipent was used. In either case, for  the first 
time in the history of the KNP, reliable 24 hour emergency cammi- 
cations were available t o  a l l  police stations. 
In FP 1969, the communicatinns complement of each Combat 
Police Force was increased with a ground-t+air radio t ransce inr  
t o  coordinate support frcm the ROK A i r  Force in counter-infiltration 
operations. 
--Field telephones vere provided t o  each Combat Police Force 
Compariy t o  improve cor~runications between Cmpany HQ and certain 
fixed outlining positions. 
--&aining equipment was obtained for two specific purposes: 
A t  the Police College, for  the &raining of CPF operators; t o  date, 
623 operators have been trained with this equipment. A t  the Seoul 
repair shop, for  the  training of maintenance 'technicians; 147 main- 
tenance technicians have been trained t o  date. 
--Additional t e s t  equipment t o  bring the repair potential of 
all ProvinOial radio repair shops t o  95% capability. 
In FP 1970, a t o t a l  of 468 SSB transceivers and associated 
equipment was procured t o  extend the Provincial network established 
in FP 1968 t o  the Police Box. None of t h i s  equipment was received 
before January 1, 1 9 n .  
Tha t e s t  equipment needed t o  cope with t h i s  additional in- 
stal lat ion and maintenance load was elso procured. 
--'he training equipment procured in FP 1969 was received and 
the training f ac i l i t i e s  then planned were established. Maintenance 
school rooms were installed, programs and curriculum prepared t o  
cope with an estimated 100 students (three levels of hodedge) per 
year. 
During FY 1 9 n ,  an additional 282 SSB transceivers were po-  
cure6 t o  complete the Police Box Network planned in PP 1970. ll~? 
first 468 transceivers were received and installations were begun; 
the planned campletion date for t h i s  project is Decwber 19n. Pre- 
liminary observations of the initial installetions indicate that  
t h i s  network w i l l  perfom in accordance with the anticipated results. 
To sumarize,  from 1966 t o  19n the  development of the  
communications sub-activity provided a l l  of the cnunter-infiltra- 
t i o n  uni t s  of t h e  KNP with an effect ive radio communicating caw- 
b i l i t y  . 
.. 
Furthermore, t he  communications management, engineeru16 3 
maintenance concepts developed while implementing this p o p a n  
rxmpted, within the  KIP, an awareness of unfulf i l led needs and 
potent ia l  which the  KNP attempted t o  f i l l  with great enthusiasm. 
Several la rge  scale  new projects were promoted and completed by 
the  KNT, out of i t s  own funds, with varying d e p e e s  of success. 
In order t o  give a direct ion of growth t o  these prolifera- 
t i n g  communication networks, t he  commun~cations advisor, a t  the  
request of the  KNP communications division cMef, prepared and sub- 
mitted a development plan ten ta t ive ly  scaled over a f i v e  year period 
and priced a t  3.5 mill ion dol la rs  or $7CO,000per year. 
Such a plan, i f  developed as  recommended, would bring all 
communicaticns functions, current and future, i n t o  one single net- 
work; would provide a multi-circuit f a c i l i t y  t o  sll major police 
centers; and a s ingle  c i r c u i t  f a c i l i t y  t o  sll police boxes. 
The equipment involved i s  not unduly s o ~ h i s t i c a t e d ;  however, 
the  engineering,maintenance and management concepts required t o  
successfully complete t h i s  task a re  beyond the present l eve l  of 
knowledge of th KNP Communications Division. The trial and error 
learning period wolild be lengthy and ccs t ly  sho~ild a competent ad- 
visor  not he present i.0 a s s i s t  t.hc KKP i n  develcping the  p r o ~ s d  
prcgram. 
Transportation 
Frm FY 1966 t o  FY 1968 trulspcrtation items were obtained 
from U.S. excess property sources and during t h i s  period a t o t a l  
of 165 vehicles and parts were turned over t o  the KNP. 
In an effor t  t o  significantly increase the mobility of the 
KNP, and especially the Combat Police, the Ibergency Task Force 
and the Seoul Mobile Force, $2,464,025 was funded for vehicles and 
parts  from the f ive  million SA add on t o  the FY 1968 project. A 
t o t a l  of 5 n  l&on vehicles was provided t o  these quick reaction 
forces and during FY 1969 an additional 35 jeep type vehicles and 
one bus were procured i n  further support of these units. The 
continued availabil i ty cf excess property provided an additional 
l l 4  vehicles and spare parts, bringing the t o t a l  U.S. lnput of 
vehicles since 1966 t o  607 direct  U.S. prccurement and 279 from 
excess property sources. Zhus 886 vehicles have been provided 
t o  the KNP since 1966 whicn represeat over 35% of the t o t a l  f l e e t  
of 2500 vehfcles. This contribution has provided essential mobfli- 
t y  t o  the  Cambat Police Companies and bergency Task Force and the 
Seoul Mobile Task Force. 'Ihe Canbat Police vehicles are used 
mostly in rough ter ra in  and the deadline rate, whlle not presently 
high vill soon become a significant factor unless p l a s  are soon 
tsken t o  increa_se the flow of spare perts  t o  the quick reaction 
force elements. One Combat Police Company cmander  told the Team 
he had spent 230,000 won (*SO) of h i s  own money dwing the past 
year for  jeep repairs because he could not cet spare pwts frocl 
K I P  headquarters. 
Weapons and Ammunit~on 
Ihe mapons and ammunition commodity inputs total ing 
approximately $1,000,000 primarily assisted t &  Combat Police 
Companies, the ,KNP armory and training act ivi t ies.  
The principal beneficiary of t h i s  input was the Gaolbat Police 
Force that  received approximately $891,700 of the total .  This  
provided the 4,100 men of the  CPCs with 5,611,290 rounds of .30 
caliber carbine m u n i t i o n  for basic loads and a reserve element; 
it also provided 1,964,780 rounds of .30 caliber carbine tracer 
ammunition; 2l.l M-79 grenade launchers together with over 21,000 
rounds of HE @mn ammunition; 7,506 fragmentation genedes; 170 
12-page shotguns together with 60,000 rounds of shotgun shells; 
50 .38 caliber revolvers; 6,000 i l l d a t i n g  f leres;  120,000 rounds 
of ./,5 caliber ammunition and 3,916 smoke grenades. 
This input provides the force with an adequate capability 
t o  perfarm thei r  coast watch assignments in s s ta te  of preparedness. 
Projected personnel additions, however, w i l l  render the CPCs in 
need of additinnal weapons and anmunition. 
'Ihe K W  armory received $47,200 worth of weapons repair 
parts and tools, together with one l o t  of ammunition reload- 
equipment. The repair parts and tools have been put t o  excellent 
use both in the new armory and i n  the three mobile shop vans that  
bring a weapons repair and maintenance capability t o  distant  f i e ld  
units. The m u n i t i o n  reloading equipment has helped t o  increase 
reloaLing production t o  6 s m a l l  d e ~ x e ,  but this capability is still 
f a r  from adequate t o  meet iwnmurition oeedn of the KNP fo r  t r a i c i z g  
act ivLties  done .  
Training a c t i v i t i e s  reccked  the remaindcr of these c o m d i t y  
capozents  f o r  firezrms t ra in ing  causes .  
.- ~ 
,Training Aids 
The t.ra5ning a ids  ccutmodity &put totaled ap?roxirrat&ly 
$67,767 over t h e  l i f e  of the  project. (Refer t o  Figtre  18, P. , 
fo r  commdity de ta i l s . )  
With th i r teen  aepsrate t ra in ing  f a c i l i t i e s ,  including nine 
Provincial Poltce Tqainiry Schools, National P ~ l i c e  College, College 
Annex in Seoul, Pusan hnd Seoul City Police schools, the c o m d i t y  
support of t h i s  ac t iv i ty  ris ra thsr  m i r 2 d . .  
The KNF has a continuing need fo r  police t r a h i n g  a t  all 
l eve l s  a t  the pressat  t i ne  and force  l eve l  i n c ~ e s s e s  pi-ojected over 
the  next few years w i l l  worsen an already pom ins t i t u t iona l  capa- 
b i l i t y  f o r  training. The exis t ing  s y s t m  could r.ot s a t i s fy  the 
qua l i t a t ive  or quant i ta t ive l e v e l s  announced k ProAg goals over 
the past  f i v e  years, and prospects f o r  improved capabi l i ty  over the 
next f e x  years v i t h m t  external assistance i s  disziel. 
Kith the  Proviwia l  Police Trc iuhg  Schoois coc t iming  t o  
su f fe r  from chronic n e ~ l e c t ,  project  ter%ir&io? f inds t k a ,  f.cr 
the  most par t ,  understdyed, poorly equippd, m d  lackln;: i n  &cic- 
quate RIXG fi;la?cial support. 
USAID PROCURED TRAMIM; AIDS FOR 28E lai'P 
FY 1966 - 197l 
Description 1966-67 1968 1969 1970-n 1 
Training Films 
Training Books 
- 1 I I 
269 ea 
31 
Overhead Projector 
Projection Screen 
12 Projector, 16 & 8 mm 
I I 
Blasting Crimper 
60 ea 
U, 
I 
7 5 
12 ea 
7 
Wire Stitcher 
Duplicating Machine 
- 
Public Address System 
FM-1 Transceiver 
FM-5 Transceiver 
C a l .  38 Revolver 
M-79 Grenade Launcher 
Air Rifle 
Binocular 9 9 l  
Spotting scope 12 * i 
7 74 
329 ea 
45 
3 Paper Cutter 
Figure 18) Training Aids Provided - 1966-1971 
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